Reconsidering accident causation analysis and evaluating the safety benefits of technologies: final results of the TRACE project by Yves Page (7149161) et al.
 
 
 
This item was submitted to Loughborough’s Institutional Repository 
(https://dspace.lboro.ac.uk/) by the author and is made available under the 
following Creative Commons Licence conditions. 
 
 
 
 
 
For the full text of this licence, please go to: 
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/2.5/ 
 
Page, 1 
 
RECONSIDERING ACCIDENT CAUSATION ANALYSIS AND EVALUATING THE SAFETY 
BENEFITS OF TECHNOLOGIES: FINAL RESULTS OF THE TRACE PROJECT 
 
 
 
 
Yves, Page 
RENAULT 
Thierry, Hermitte 
Cyril, Chauvel 
LAB 
Pierre, Van Elslande 
INRETS 
France 
Julian, Hill 
Alan, Kirk 
VSRC 
Loughborough University 
United Kingdom 
Heinz, Hautzinger 
IVT 
Sylvia, Schick 
Wolfram, Hell 
LMU 
Germany 
Kosmas, Alexopolous 
Menelaos, Pappas 
LMS 
Greece 
Aquilino, Molinero 
Jose Miguel, Perandones 
CIDAUT 
Jose Manuel, Barrios 
IDIADA 
Spain 
Paper Number 09-0148 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
The objectives of the EU-funded project TRACE 
(TRaffic Accident Causation in Europe, 2006-2008) 
are the up-dating of the etiology of road accidents 
and the assessment of the safety benefits of 
promising technology-based solutions. 
The analyses are based on available, reliable and 
accessible existing databases (access to which has 
been greatly facilitated by a number of partners 
highly experienced in safety analysis, coming from 8 
different countries and having access to different 
kinds of databases, in-depth or regional or national 
statistics in their own country). 
Apart from considerable improvements in the 
methodologies applicable to accident research in the 
field of human factors, statistics and epidemiology, 
allowing a better understanding of the crash 
generating issues, the TRACE project quantified the 
expected safety benefits for existing and future safety 
applications. 
As for existing safety functions or safety packages, 
the main striking results show that any increment of a 
passive or active safety function selected in this 
project produces additional safety benefits. In general, 
the safety gains are even higher for higher injury 
severity levels. For example, if all cars were Euro 
NCAP five stars and fitted with EBA and ESC, 
compared to four stars without ESC and EBA, injury 
accidents would be reduced by 47%, all injuries 
would be mitigated by 68% and severe + fatal 
injuries by 70%. 
As for future advanced safety functions, TRACE 
investigated 19 safety systems. The results show that 
the greatest additional safety gains potential are 
expected from intelligent speed adaptation systems, 
automatic crash notification systems, and collision 
warning and collision avoidance systems. Their 
expected benefits (expected reduction in the total 
number of injured persons if the fleet is 100% 
equipped) are between 6% and 11%. Safety benefits 
of other systems are more often below 5%. Some 
systems have a very low expected safety benefit 
(around or less than 1%). 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
The EUropean Council for Automotive Research 
(EUCAR) launched in 2001 an initiative to develop a 
systemic approach to the problem of road safety: 
Integrated Safety. The idea was to revisit the Safety 
problem with a holistic System Approach. In 2008, a 
few projects (AIDE, PREVENT, EASIS, APROSYS, 
SAFESPOT, CVIS, WATCH-OVER, etc.) have 
already produced methodologies and results. Just a 
few of these research integrated projects or sub 
projects (i.e. Aprosys, Prevent-Intersafe) called for 
prior accident analysis in order to start further tasks 
(development of models, simulations, technologies, 
demonstrators, tests, etc.) on a thorough 
understanding of the real-world problems. 
Consequently, this knowledge is sometimes 
considered as a missing plinth. 
Simultaneously, an eSafety Forum was established by 
the European Commission DG Information Society 
in 2001 as a joint platform involving all road safety 
stakeholders. The Forum adopted twenty-eight 
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recommendations towards the better use of 
Information and Communication Technologies (ICT) 
for improved road safety. But, even though former 
research in accident causation and impact assessment 
produced a tremendous amount of knowledge, the 
exact nature of the contribution that ICT can make to 
road safety could not be determined because 
consistent EU-wide accident causation analysis was 
not sufficiently available to gauge this impact.  
Consequently, the first of these recommendations 
sought to consolidate analyses from existing accident 
and risk exposure data sources for a better 
understanding of the causes and circumstances of 
road accidents and to determine the most promising 
and/or effective counter measures.  The second 
recommendation called for the establishment of a 
common format for recording accident data to 
develop an information system covering all EU 
Member States. 
Simultaneously, The EU was funding an important 
project, SafetyNet (The European Road Safety 
Observatory), which particularly aims at making 
consistent accident data collection protocols in 
several EU countries and at constituting an accident 
databank on injury and fatal accidents.  
But the project had just started in 2004 and would 
provide neither accident data, nor accident analysis in 
the short term. Moreover this project did not aim at 
identifying relevant methodologies to evaluate the 
effectiveness and efficiency of safety systems based 
on technology. To try to overcome these problems in 
the short term, one of the e-safety Working Group 
(Accident Analysis) examined available data sources 
which were known to them.   
The analysis confirmed the hypothesis of the working 
group that although many information sources 
already existed, they were not enough as they 
currently exist to provide Europe with the analysis it 
needs because the picture obtained was a mixed one. 
Some data sources were never designed for the 
purpose of coordinated analysis and therefore have 
little potential. Some others have their main focus on 
passive safety, biomechanics or traumatology and do 
not give much insight into the causes of the accidents 
they contain.  Others have considerable potential. 
Based on this qualitative analysis of existing sources 
the working group recommended to the eSafety 
Forum that existing sources could nevertheless help 
to give a better understanding on accident causation 
and to evaluate (at least partially) the effectiveness of 
some on-board safety functions, if shared analysis 
mechanisms are employed to interrogate the different 
data sources and share the results.  
The TRACE proposal was born. It was submitted to 
the EU in 2005, with two main objectives: 
- The determination and the continuous up-dating of 
the etiology, i.e. causes, of road accidents and the 
assessment of whether the existing technologies or 
the technologies under current development address 
the real needs of the road users inferred from the 
accident and driver behavior analyses.  
- The identification and the assessment (in terms of 
saved lives, injuries mitigation and avoided 
accidents), among possible technology-based safety 
functions, of the most promising solutions that can 
assist the driver or any other road users in a normal 
road situation or in an emergency situation or, as a 
last resort, mitigate the violence of crashes and 
protect the vehicle occupants, the pedestrians, and the 
two-wheelers in case of a crash or a rollover. 
This current paper gives a synthesis of the principal 
striking TRACE outcomes. It is therefore a non-
comprehensive summary of what is available in the 
32 technical and scientific reports that TRACE has 
generated. The reader is highly encouraged to look at 
the technical reports for a more in-depth inquiry into 
TRACE objectives, challenges and achievements. 
The paper is split up into 3 chapters. The first one 
‘Methodologies’ briefly reports about methodologies 
developed in TRACE with regards to human factors 
analysis and statistics. The second one ‘Accident 
Causation’ reports about the first objective of the 
project, whereas the third one ‘Evaluation’ reports 
about the second objective. 
Please see [27] for further information regarding the 
project structure of TRACE and the involved partners. 
 
METHODOLOGIES 
 
Human Factors 
 
Accident causation can seem misleadingly simple, 
nearly obvious. It is thus often assumed that there is 
one cause or one road user responsible for an 
accident and that it would just take determining that 
cause or this responsible road user, suppressing the 
first and punishing the second, to prevent the accident 
occurring. Maybe such a view had reached a relative 
validity in the old times of the driving system when 
monolithic defects were easy to diagnose. However, 
it is less and less proving to be efficient as the system 
is continuously improving on the basis of research 
and developments addressing the different 
components involved. The problem is that, more and 
more, a cause becomes a cause only if it combines 
with several other hidden ones, and the so considered 
'responsible road user' is more and more the heir of 
the influence of these combination of factors 
intervening in the driving interactions. Road safety of 
the 21st century has become a matter of complexity, 
apart from some residual extreme cases showing 
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atypical accident patterns (e.g. involving big holes on 
the road, breakdown of the car brakes, aberrant 
drivers' behaviours). In order to keep improving 
safety, it has become essential to study this 
complexity. And the more we will gain in safety, the 
more thorough research works will be necessary to 
go on progressing.  
The European TRACE project is turned towards 
developing a better understanding of accident 
causation, in order to reach the definition of more 
appropriate preventative measures, involving notably 
electronic safety functions.. Along this objective, 
Work Package 5 'Human Factors' of this project has 
been designed to contribute to the development of a 
deeper analysis of the difficulties encountered by the 
human component, the road user, in order to promote 
an improving of the driving system which is put at 
his disposal. The work done in TRACE WP5 has led 
to several operational grids of analysis, in line with 
theoretical models, which offer a means to 
progressing the understanding of the human role in 
accident generation, and in the methods allowing a 
better diagnosis of the causes of human errors, 
violations, and exceeding capacity. The underlying 
concept behind these grids is oriented toward a 'safe 
system model', keeping in mind that the purpose of 
any device dedicated to a human use should be 
conceived and built in a way of neither being 
problematic nor dangerous for its users. So should be 
the driving system. 
In a first step, a grid has been created for analysing 
the operational difficulties that human beings can 
find in driving, potentially resulting in accidents [16]. 
This grid delineates so-called 'Human Functional 
Failures' (HFF) representing the weaknesses and 
limits in adaptive capacity of the human functions 
(perception, comprehension, anticipation, decision, 
action) to which drivers appeal in order to drive 
efficiently. And as far as an accident is not 
intentional for anyone (otherwise it is no more an 
accident) each HFF is considered as the result of a 
malfunction characterizing the driving system as a 
whole. It is a symptom which manifests a wrong 
interaction between a road user and his driving task 
environment. Human failure should not be considered 
– which is often the case - as the cause of the 
accident but rather as a weak link in a malfunction 
chain, this chain being necessary to find out if any 
efficient solution is thought to be defined. Thus, once 
a human functional failure is diagnosed, it still has to 
be defined which factors and which contexts have 
originated it. 
The problem with many accident causation coding 
systems currently used across Europe is that they do 
not separate the ‘errors’ (or human functional 
failures) from the ‘factors’ which lead to these 
failures. The second step of the methodological work 
consisted in building a grid allowing the 
determination of all the elements (factors) - would 
they be referring to the road layout, the vehicle 
parameters, the driver or the traffic surrounding - that 
could originate or favour a Human Functional Failure, 
not confusing these factors with their consequences 
[17]. A complementary grid also provides a 
classification of 'pre-accident driving situations' in 
which human failures occur. These pre-accident 
driving situations are built from a combination of: 1- 
the types of driving tasks (e.g. overtaking, crossing, 
turning), 2- their location (e.g. intersection, straight 
road, roundabout) and 3- the potential conflicts met 
in the situation (e.g. pedestrian crossing, oncoming 
vehicle, car door opening). The precise 
characterisation of these pre-accident situations in 
accident studies allows definition of the 
circumstances in which road users find difficulties.  
A third step of this methodological work consisted of 
providing a method allowing the aggregation of 
similar accident processes on a multidimensional 
level (a scenario) [18]. The method consists in 
building typical scenarios of human failure 
production, integrating the elements studied in the 
previous steps. The Typical Human Functional 
Failure Scenarios represent the regularities which can 
be found in the process governing similar accidents. 
They are expressed under the shape of chains which 
connect a pre-accident situation, explicative elements 
involved, a consequent human functional failure and 
a resultant critical situation leading to a crash 
configuration. But a main difficulty in the 
determination of all these detailed variables is the 
necessity to base them upon in-depth accident data 
performed by specialists in the different domains. In 
order to allow accidentologists using data that doesn't 
fulfil these ideal conditions (i.e. in-depth, involving 
psychologists), we have defined the most frequent 
scenarios found in the study of a large sample of in-
depth accident cases, on which to base in order to 
recognize the overall process on a 'family air' basis, 
which can be done from less in-depth data.  
A last methodological work performed in TRACE 
WP5 is differentiated from the previous ones in its 
more prospective purpose. It was aimed at enlarging 
the classical view on driving behaviour determinants 
by incorporating the social and cultural dimensions as 
further upstream factors of human functional failures. 
Factors such as culture, social status or specific social 
group membership have an identifiable influence on 
individual behaviour. It presents a scheme of analysis 
built upon the notion of 'social spheres' [19]. This 
scheme is aimed at showing the relative influence of 
the different layers ('spheres') of socio-cultural 
variables that are located outside the individual 
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sphere and which can potentially have a latent or 
manifest influence on the production of an accident. 
The integration of such socio-cultural background 
variables in the analysis of human failure production 
has the potential to increase the understanding of the 
accident causation process and to find additional 
means to fight against. These aspects should notably 
be taken into account when dealing with driving aids, 
so as to appropriately answer the needs and 
constraints coming from different drivers' social 
groups. 
The different deliverables of WP5 have been 
provided to progress the search for understating 
accident causation and its underlying and upstream 
determinants. As such they contribute to the 
European TRACE project objectives of promoting a 
scientific knowledge on accident causation, so as to 
better defining the safety measures able reducing it. 
In this respect, the overall point of WP5 is to remind 
that the road user is the core of the driving system, 
and human performance the measure of its 
effectiveness. That is why possible human failures 
must be studied in-depth, their causes and producing 
contexts clarified in order to put forward the most 
efficient measures able at harmonizing human 
travelling behaviour inside the traffic system. The 
methods proposed regarding as 'Human Factors' 
allow a more integrative approach inside accident 
research in Europe. This is being done in numerous 
studies conducted in TRACE operational work 
packages, addressed to the different road user groups 
(elderly drivers, PTW, passenger cars, gender issue, 
etc.), to the main identified driving situations 
(intersection, specific manoeuvres, degraded 
situations, etc.) and to the most involved factors 
(vigilance, attention, experience, infrastructure, etc.). 
These different studies increase the understanding 
regarding human factors in accident causation and the 
necessity to develop a safe system well addressed to 
human needs. And the 'human factors' methods put 
forward in TRACE WP5 will be useful and 
constructive when considering the building of a 
comprehensive European road safety observatory. 
 
Statistical Analysis Methodologies 
 
The overall objectives of TRACE WP7 ‘Statistical 
Analysis’ have been twofold: 
- to improve statistical methodology for diagnosis of 
road safety problems and evaluation of promising 
technological solutions 
- to provide methodological advice and statistical 
services to other TRACE work packages. 
In its empirical part, the TRACE project exclusively 
relies on existing European data on traffic safety. 
Thus, statistical methods for collecting accident and 
exposure data have not been treated. Rather, 
quantitative methods serving the following purposes 
have been investigated:  
- methods for improving the usability of existing 
accident and exposure databases 
- methods for traffic accident causation studies 
- methods for accident and injury risk studies 
- methods for safety functions effectiveness 
evaluation and prediction. 
WP7 has also provided traffic safety researchers with 
a statistical expansion method for addressing accident 
causation issues at European level accounting for the 
fact that accident and exposure data availability 
varies substantially between the countries.  
In all these areas the scientific work under WP7 has 
developed operational statistical models in the 
conceptual framework of general “systemic” theories 
of the accident generating process. Emphasis was put 
in WP7 on careful selection, adaptation and 
application of appropriate classical and newer 
implementation-ready methods from the various 
fields of the statistical sciences. For all results both 
scientific rigor for the statistical community and 
accessibility for empirical accident researchers had to 
be achieved. The principal aim of WP7 was to 
provide best practice examples of high-quality traffic 
safety research using up-to-date statistical methods. 
 
     Improving the usability of existing accident 
databases. The purpose of this activity has been to 
enable traffic safety researchers to make best possible 
use of existing European accident and exposure 
databases [21]. Therefore, the task has covered 
methods to overcome typical accident and exposure 
data quality problems like missing values, missing 
variables and biases due to selective data collection.  
Under certain conditions data quality problems of the 
types listed above can be overcome using appropriate 
statistical methods: imputation methods for treating 
data with missing values, data fusion methods for 
supplementing missing variables and weighting and 
expansion methods for reducing biases due to 
selectivity of sampling in in-depth studies have been 
studied.  
Frequently, researchers need to address accident 
causation issues at the European level in situations 
where no complete empirical data is available. 
Therefore, an expansion method for creating 
synthetic tables at EU level, by combining detailed 
data from regional studies or national sources with 
coarser structural information on traffic accidents in 
Europe as a whole under an appropriate statistical 
model, has been developed. 
 
     Analysis methods for accident causation studies. 
It is obvious that accident causation analysis is a 
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matter of importance in TRACE. In order to provide 
appropriate methodological support to the operational 
work packages, this task deals with analysis methods 
for accident causation studies. Emphasis lies on 
exploratory or hypothesis-generating methods, as 
confirmatory or hypothesis-testing methods of 
accident and injury risk analysis [23].  
First, a theoretical framework for causal analysis in 
accident causation research has been proposed and 
problems linked with establishing causal 
relationships have been discussed. Then, in view of 
the huge volume of many accident databases, some 
data mining tools have been investigated which are 
highly relevant for accident experts. Specific 2D 
graphical representations (self-organizing maps) of 
the different risk factors can provide, at a glance, a 
qualitative understanding of possible accident causes. 
In a subsequent step, information theoretic methods 
(mutual information ratio) can be used to quantify 
more precisely the impact of each single factor. By 
automatic learning, a function can be constructed to 
forecast, for instance, accident severity given a set of 
pre-selected factors.  
In addition, nonparametric statistical methods which 
do not require any model presumptions have been 
examined and applied to measure the relationship 
between injury risk and potential determining factors. 
 
     Analysis methods for accident and injury risk 
studies. In studies of traffic accident causation, 
researchers frequently aim to assess risk factors for 
accident involvement and accidental injury. 
Consequently, this task provides the operational work 
packages of TRACE with appropriate methodological 
tools from accident and injury epidemiology [22].  
As different types of accident and exposure databases 
are encountered in the TRACE project, special 
emphasis is placed on study designs which fit to the 
available data sources. Among other things, it has 
been shown how to conduct accident causation 
studies using easily accessible routine accident and 
exposure data under different study designs such as, 
for instance, the case-control design. Analysis 
methods for accident causation studies relying 
exclusively on accident data (concept of induced 
exposure) have also been critically examined. The 
tailor-made statistical tools treated in this task enable 
accident researchers to identify whether there is a 
relationship between a set of potential risk factors 
and accident involvement or accidental injury.  
In order to make the statistical concepts and methods 
easily accessible also to researchers who are not 
experts in statistics and/or epidemiology, numerous 
examples and detailed empirical case studies have 
been integrated in the technical reports. 
 
     Evaluation of the safety benefits of existing 
safety functions: statistical methodologies. The aim 
of this task has been to develop and improve 
quantitative methods for ex post evaluation of the 
effects of specific in-vehicle safety functions. 
Appropriate analytical approaches have been 
investigated for this purpose. The methods developed 
under this task have been extensively applied in 
TRACE WP4 “Evaluation” [24].  
The scientific work deals with statistical methods for 
evaluating safety features which are already on the 
market. The methods - exclusively relying on 
empirical traffic accident data - are not only suitable 
for the evaluation of individual safety devices but 
may also be applied to assess any combination of 
passive and active safety features. It is shown in 
detail how to compute accident avoiding 
effectiveness as well as injury avoiding and injury 
mitigation effectiveness taking account of 
confounding factors where necessary. The 
methodology is demonstrated on real-world data 
examples. 
 
     Concluding remarks. Basically, the scientific 
work carried out under TRACE Work Package 7 
“Statistical Methods” has dealt with the following 
two questions: 
- How can statistical methods contribute to improve 
our empirical knowledge on traffic accident causation 
in Europe? 
- How can statistical methods contribute to identify 
safety systems suitable for traffic accident prevention 
and accidental injury mitigation?  
The application of statistical methods in the field of 
traffic safety has a long tradition. Thus, it was clear 
from the outset that among the statistical sciences 
especially the discipline of epidemiology offers a 
wide variety of concepts, methods and models that 
can be applied either directly or after some proper 
adaptation to answer the above research questions.  
- Study of the incidence of accidents and of the 
frequency distribution of accident characteristics is 
essentially a descriptive exercise. This, however, 
does not mean that only the methods of descriptive 
statistics are relevant. As accidents and accidental 
injuries occur randomly, analytical methods based on 
probability models, e.g. models and methods of 
sampling theory are needed already at this stage. 
- Research on the determinants of road traffic 
accidents can best be conducted under an 
epidemiological framework providing the accident 
researcher with suitable study designs and analysis 
tools. Study of determinants considers the aetiology 
of accidents and accidental injury. In this context, of 
course, a distinction has to be made between potential 
and proven aetiological agents. Especially when 
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using routine data on traffic participation and 
accident involvement the empirical findings referring 
to risk factors for accident involvement may be 
largely descriptive and should not be over-interpreted 
in a causal sense. 
- Likewise, assessment of the effectiveness of 
innovative safety systems already launched onto the 
market must also observe the methodological 
principles developed in epidemiology. Ex post 
evaluation of new safety systems should especially 
utilize the methodological principles developed for 
observational studies where it is difficult or even 
impossible to find a control group in the classical 
sense. As has been shown in the TRACE Reports, 
proper epidemiological model building is essential if 
meaningful conclusions on the effectiveness of single 
or multiple safety functions are to be drawn. 
As can be seen, statistical methods in general 
together with specific concepts established for high-
quality epidemiological research are indispensable 
tools both for establishing accident causation factors 
and for evaluating safety systems aiming at accident 
prevention and injury mitigation.    
In the TRACE reports, a large number of classical 
and newer statistical methods, including methods 
from the field of artificial intelligence, have been 
investigated and explored for use in accident 
causation studies and safety system assessment.  As 
can be expected, these methods differ in their degree 
of suitability for accident research purposes. In the 
conclusions, this aspect is addressed. In addition, it is 
always clearly stated whether or not the method 
under consideration is accessible to traffic safety 
analysts not specializing in statistics or should better 
be applied by statistical experts only.  
Not surprisingly, one comes to the conclusion that 
high-quality research on traffic accident causation 
presupposes correspondingly high methodological 
standards. These standards, of course, can best be 
ensured in interdisciplinary teams involving experts 
from statistics and epidemiology. The TRACE 
project serves as a good example of this. 
 
Data 
 
Work Package 8 was the data provision work 
package of the TRACE Project [25].  The analysts 
working in the other Work Packages were able to 
request data from designated data providers.  The 
objective of Work Package 8 was not to produce a 
database of harmonised data.  It was to provide 
suitable aggregated data (crosstabulations) from 
existing individual databases that analysts could 
consider in answering the specific research questions 
of the Work Packages. 
The main features and achievements of the work of 
Work Package 8 are summarised below. 
An effective Data Exchange Methodology that is 
both understandable and suitable has been put in 
place, allowing TRACE to make the best use of 
existing data. 
Participants in Work Package 8 have successfully 
prepared large, complex sets of data tables for the 
analysts in the Operational Work Packages of 
TRACE. 
- At least 940 requested tables, in 83 worksheets, 
as part of 23 data requests have been handled. 
- Approximately 3,700 tables of data have been 
prepared and returned to analysts.  The concept of 
counting data packages and monitoring effort has 
had to evolve and be reshaped as the project 
developed but the volume of data exchange is as 
large, if not more, than originally planned. 
- In light of an expected lack of risk exposure 
data, analysts have been provided with a tool to 
understand and access a wide range of data 
already published. 
Recommendations for future European data gathering 
activities are made, along with support to current 
initiatives from a TRACE perspective: 
- Continuing harmonisation of variables and 
definitions, for descriptive, in-depth and exposure 
data.  This would allow both easier data provision 
and analysis. 
- Development of a Pan-European accident 
classification coding system.  Accident classification 
is an important step in both understanding accident 
causation and evaluating the potential of new safety 
systems. 
- Harmonisation of accident causation coding 
systems.  Any proposed systems should be tested 
against the broad and in-depth questions posed in the 
TRACE tasks. 
- Development of European field operational tests.  
An understanding of human interaction with new 
vehicle technologies (both for safety and comfort) 
will allow a much fuller evaluation of the potential 
effect of such devices on safety. 
- Development of European risk exposure data.  
Greater availability and depth of risk exposure data 
would allow a new perspective on the analysis of 
accident causation. 
- Further development of the CARE database and 
interface.  More countries would allow a better 
European context, and further development of the 
interface would give more flexibility when 
examining specific accident scenarios. 
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ACCIDENT CAUSATION 
 
Current knowledge needs to be structured and linked 
to specific research angles and analysed according to 
specific methodologies to avoid misunderstanding 
and to allow a clear view of what accident causation 
is. Therefore, TRACE had three different research 
angles to cover accident causation issues: 
- The Road user approach: it allows identifying 
specific causation factors for specific road users. 
- The Types of situation approach: as the road user 
can be confronted with different driving situations, 
that can develop into different emergency situations, 
that deserve specific analysis regardless of the road 
user type. 
- The Types of factors approach: factors can be 
identified and observed according to social and 
cultural factors, factors related to the trip itself and 
factors related to the driving task. 
These 3 approaches are developed according to three 
different kinds of analyses: 
- A macroscopic statistical analysis aimed at 
describing the main problems.   
- A microscopic analysis aimed at describing the 
accident mechanisms with the use of in–depth data. 
- A risk analysis aimed at quantifying the risk factors 
in terms of risk, relative risk and, where possible, 
attributable risks. 
TRACE produced a lot of research outputs 
combining these three approaches and these three 
types of analysis. We are reporting below only the 
main findings [1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8]. 
 
Types of factors 
 
A variety of theories on accident causation exists and 
up until today no synthesis has emerged [5]. Theories 
and models reflect peoples’ views on reality to 
explain complex relations in simplified ways. The 
motivation lies in the belief that every accident can 
be prevented, if the causes for this accident can be 
eliminated. Accident Models help to understand the 
occurrence of traffic accidents and give answers to 
questions on how and why accidents happen, where 
and when they take place, and who is involved, and 
furthermore to find according preventive measures.  
Epidemiological studies can reveal risk factors for 
crashes that increase the chance for an accident to 
occur or the chance for someone to cause, or just be 
involved in an accident. Additionally, in-depth 
accident research identifies factors that contributed to 
a specific accident and are able to explain the 
occurrence of the accident. This is done by applying 
causality to certain factors that led to the accident. 
Most in-depth accident databases provide a list of 
factors, from which the investigator can choose the 
factors that contributed to the accident. Some 
investigation classifications code key events or 
triggering factors, in addition to also considering the 
most important factors, or the last factors, that finally 
caused the accident in the causal chain in time, 
respectively. 
Of course, usually one factor cannot cause an 
accident. Most often a combination of contributing 
factors, forming a sufficient cause, leads to the 
accident [5, 16]. 
In the model, the classification of accident related 
factors is two dimensional. One dimension is 
expressing the time (accident process) by levels, and 
the other dimension reflects the origin from where a 
factor stems from (from a "traditional view") by 
components. Generalised examples are used in the 
table 1 to visualize the classification of factors. 
 
 
Table 1. Classification of accident related factors
Levels and 
Components 
Background factors Trip related factors (task 3.3) 
Driving task associated factors 
(task 3.4) 
Environment Modes of Transport,  Climate Road characteristics Road and light condition 
Vehicle Vehicle fleet, safety standards 
Vehicle type and maintenance 
status 
Vehicle condition and 
performance 
Human 
Transportation politics, Socio-
demographic characteristics 
(task 3.2) 
Physical and mental state 
Actual behaviour and 
performance 
 
 
The analysis showed that already on a random choice 
of cases, a lot of sociological and cultural factors are 
found, that influence the following acts, behaviours, 
vehicles involved in the accident etc. But, of course it 
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is not possible to explain every accident in 
sociological terms. And this is not wanted from a 
prevention point of view, which in modern society of 
course tries to protect the individuals but also tries to 
give responsibility back to the individual. It is 
however, necessary to know the underlying reasons 
for some factors found on a trip or even driving task 
level. Sociological and cultural factors are just one 
component of the background factors, although 
strong interactions between those factors and 
environmental and vehicle related factors on a 
background level can be expected.  
It has been possible to identify not only the most 
‘typical’ characteristics of accidents where trip 
related or driving task-related factors are involved  
but also to identify the main reasons for what went 
wrong in the accidents where these factors and their 
associated characteristics, are present.  
After screening literature and accident databases to 
find, define and classify relevant factors, the results 
from methodological WP’s were also taken into 
account to decide how to proceed. It was decided to 
especially analyse accidents where the following 
factors contributed by statistical database analysis 
and some of the factors also by in-depth case 
analysis: alcohol, vigilance, experience, vehicle 
condition, road condition and layout, attention, 
sudden health problems, speed (including 
‘inappropriate speeding’ and ‘illegal speeding’), and 
technical defects. 
Factors are regarded to be relevant either by risk 
increase or by high prevalence as contributing to 
accidents. After screening literature and accident 
databases to find, define and classify relevant factors 
on the trip and driving task level, the results 
(methods) from methodological WP’s were then 
applied to accidents caused by the relevant factors.. 
Following factors were analysed by statistical 
database analysis and by in-depth case analysis 
applying the WP5 human functional failure analysis: 
alcohol, vigilance, experience, vehicle condition, 
road condition and layout, attention, sudden health 
problems, speed (including ‘inappropriate speeding’ 
and ‘illegal speeding’), and technical defects. 
According to the different methods and databases 
used the results are manifold when analyzing 
accident causation from a factors point of view.  One 
interesting result e.g. is that an alcohol related 
accident is predominantly found for pedestrians 
and/or cyclists in the UK, Germany and the Czech 
Republic, whereas in Spain, Italy, and France all road 
user groups are affected. Another example for the 
results is the notion that if a young driver (<25years) 
is involved in a driving accident with frontal impact 
on a rural road with a speed limit between 60 and 
100km/h in winter and nighttime, then it is very 
likely that the road condition and layout contributed 
to this accident. And the next example stems from the 
functional failure analysis for alcohol related 
accidents: Whereas the primary active road user (the 
one inducing the accident situation) often is the 
impaired one showing loss or restrictions in 
consciousness and ratio, for the opponent often 
visibility (of the active road user) plays an important 
role in contributing to the accidents occurrence. The 
failures of "Expecting a non-priority vehicle not to 
undertake a manoeuvre in intersection" or "Road user 
surprised by a pedestrian (or two-wheeler) on 
approach" shows a tendency for the fact, that the 
primary active road user (here: the alcoholised one) 
performed unforeseeable actions that were not 
possible to see (visibility) or predict from the 
opponents point of view and the accidents therefore 
hardly to avoid. 
In general it has been possible to identify not only the 
most ‘typical’ characteristics of accidents where trip 
related or driving task-related factors are involved  
but also to identify the main reasons for what went 
wrong in the accidents where these factors and their 
associated characteristics, are present.  
 
Types of users 
 
TRACE WP1 (Road Users) addressed the analysis of 
the different accident causation mechanisms of each 
of the road user groups (passenger car occupants, 
powered two wheelers, van, bus and trucks occupants, 
pedestrians and pedal cyclists, elderly people and 
gender related crashes). Some of the findings for 
passenger car occupants are reported below, after 
having given a look at the general statistics of 
mortality (figure 1), which show that other road users 
are also of high interest in terms of mortality and 
accident process. Other findings for the other types of 
users are available in the TRACE reports [1, 2]. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1.  Distribution of Road Fatalities on the 
European Roads (Source: ERSO).  
Heavy trucks, 3.4%
Others, 1.9%
Pedal Cyclists, 
6.2%
Mopeds, 4.8%
Motorcyclists, 
12.0%
Passenger car 
occupants, 52.7%
Pedestrians, 19.3%
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     Passenger Car Drivers. When examined from 
the angle of human functional failures, it can be 
noted that cars drivers are particularly prone to 
perception errors, this category of failures being 
observed in 35.7% of the cases that compose the 
studied sample. 
The most frequently identified pre-accident situations 
are spread between the driving ‘Stabilized’ situations 
and the tasks to perform when managing intersection 
crossings (‘Going ahead on a straight road’ 15.2% 
and ‘Crossing intersection with a priority vehicle 
coming’ 12.7% are the most frequent pre-accident 
situations observed in the sample). 
The study of explanatory elements also brings 
information on the way functional failures occur. 
Several elements come out (‘Atypical manoeuvres 
from other users’, ‘Road over familiarity or 
monotony of the travel’, Choice of too a high speed 
for the situation’, etc.), but it can be seen that again 
the distribution of the elements is wide-spread. 
These results shed light to the interest of looking at 
the data in a more relevant way than the overall one, 
so specificities can emerge more clearly. Two 
categories of crashes have been studied: Single cars 
accidents and cars vs. other road users. 
When analysed separately, the drivers of the single 
car accidents sample feature a specific profile. Firstly 
because their accident happens when the task to 
perform is quite simple: the pre-accident situations 
are always related to stabilized situations and more 
specifically to guiding the vehicle on the carriageway 
(either or straightway road or during curve 
negotiation). 
Additionally, the human functional failures 
associated to those drivers are typical of losses of 
control. Here are found, in 40 % of cases , handling 
difficulties (associated with attention impairment or 
external disturbance such wet carriageway or wind 
blast).  
The losses of psycho-physiological capacities are 
also found in the same proportions (38.7%) as being 
the cause of the single car accident. This loss is 
mainly due to psychotropic intake (alcohol for the 
major part of the drivers) but the drivers falling 
asleep account for 15.4% of those accidents.  
At last, in 1 case out of 5, the drivers have had 
troubles to perform a correct evaluation of a road 
difficulty. Those losses of control are related to 
changes in road situations in almost 1 case out of 4 
but the layout is not the only element that should be 
underlined here. The majority of factors are 
endogenous, that is associated to drivers' states or 
their conditions of task realization. What is found as 
having an influence on the losses of control are: in 
one third of the cases, the alcohol intake; the speed 
chosen by the drivers (36.7%); the level of attention 
allocated to the driving task; and at last the level of 
experience of the road users, either concerning their 
driving knowledge, the familiarity they have of their 
vehicle or of the location of the accident. 
All these explanatory elements have a role when 
combined with each other until the drivers fail to 
perform the task, although quite simple, as if this 
particular association of parameters was having 
influence on the most rooted abilities developed in 
driving activity, the skill-based ones. On the other 
hand, the accident mechanisms observed for the 
group of multi-vehicles collisions are various. First in 
the tasks to realize: they cover many pre-accident 
situations and concern stabilized situations as well as 
intersection crossing of specific manoeuvres. This 
heterogeneity is also found in failures and 
explanatory elements. It is then with the help of the 
typical generating failure scenario that light is 
brought on the specificities of this population. 
Perceptive failures are central in these kinds of 
accidents and they reveal the multiplicity of the 
problems encountered by the drivers when they 
interact with others: 
- Visibility constraints are decisive in almost 6% of 
the accidents cases, especially when they prevent the 
drivers from detecting the atypical manoeuvre of the 
other road users. 
- The search for directions and the monitoring of 
potential conflict with others are the causes of 
monopolisation of the driver's attention, leading him 
to not detect the relevant information. 
- A low level of attention devoted to the driving task 
has also impact on the detection of the other, 
especially if the task to perform is familiar and if the 
environment is dense and the traffic important, or if 
the driver is lost in his/her thoughts. 
Misleading indications are also at the origin of some 
'Processing' distortions. A same indication sometimes 
having several meanings and being then ambiguous, 
the driver undertakes the wrong manoeuvre regarding 
the other's behaviour. 
The wrong expectations concerning the others' 
manoeuvres are also very represented in this sample 
of passenger cars drivers. Although those 
manoeuvres are sometimes difficult to anticipate, the 
rigid attachment of their right of way status that the 
drivers develop is generally at the core of the 
scenarios putting forward those 'Prognosis' failures 
and scenarios. 
 
Types of situations 
 
TRACE identified four specific groups of situations 
covering the majority of the real-world driving 
situations: 
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- Stabilized Traffic Scenarios concerning every 
normal driving situation that can become risky due to 
specific failures (e.g. guidance errors) or sudden 
conflict situations with other road users. 
- Specific Manoeuvre Scenarios including accidents 
due to scenarios created by performing specific 
driving manoeuvres (e.g. overtaking, U-turning, car-
following, joining a carriageway, etc.). 
- Degradation Scenarios gathering accidents 
concerned with the presence of factors which degrade 
the road way, the environment (fog, heavy rain) and 
trigger accidents. 
- Intersection Scenarios that concern every situation 
occurring at or close to an intersection. 
Examples of analysis concerning the three first 
situations are given below. Intersection scenarios are 
reported in a separate paper . 
 
     Stabilized situations. These situations represent 
49% of the total number of situations in EU27 and 
33% of the total number of injury accidents in Europe 
(estimation relying on results coming from Spain, 
UK, France, Greece and Czech Republic). The main 
results regarding the identification of the causes are 
the following: 
 
     Specific manoeuvres. These situations represent 
7% of the total number of situations in EU27 and 
24% of the total number of injury accidents in Europe 
(estimation relying on results coming from Spain, 
UK, France, Greece and Czech Republic). The main 
results regarding the identification of the causes are 
the following: 
   Degradation situations. The accidents in degraded 
conditions (in dark and/or bad weather conditions 
only) represent 35% of the total number of injury 
accidents in EU27, 46% of the overall fatalities (3% 
of the casualties in degraded situation) and 39% of 
severely injured (14% of the casualties in degraded 
situation). The main results regarding the 
identification of the causes are the following: 
 
EVALUATION 
 
The second principal aim of TRACE was to 
investigate the impact of advanced safety functions 
on reducing several types of injury crashes involving 
passenger cars or restricting (mitigating) crash 
consequences (so-called safety benefits). WP6 
provided at the beginning of the project a list of the 
most promising safety functions that address current 
and future accident types on European roads.  
The evaluation has been performed from two 
different perspectives: 
- Assessment of the potential proportion of injury 
accidents that could be avoided and of the potential 
proportion of injury accidents whose severity could 
be reduced, for safety functions, of passenger cars, 
not already on the market (this is the so-called a 
priori effectiveness).  
- Assessment of the actual proportion of injury  
accidents that could be avoided and of the actual 
proportion of accidents whose severity could be 
reduced, for safety functions, of passenger cars, 
already on the market (this is the so-called a 
posteriori effectiveness) once the cars are equipped 
with existing functions. 
 
A Priori Effectiveness 
 
Different methods have been applied and different 
data used [9, 10, 11, 12].  The allocation of the safety 
functions to different methods is presented in table 2. 
These different methods are presented extensively in 
the TRACE reports. It is also argued why different 
methods were necessary and why, given the low 
effectiveness of some safety functions, it is assumed 
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that the discrepancies between the methods are not 
introducing too much bias in the comparison of the 
results. 
 
Table 2. Safety functions selected for evaluation and method used for evaluating the safety benefits 
# Safety System 
Method 
“Target 
population” 
method 
Effectiveness 
evaluation 
Unit HARM 
Neural 
Networks  
1 Tyre Pressure and Monitoring X    
2 Lane Keeping Support X    
3 Lane Changing Support X    
4 Cornering Brake Control X    
5 Traffic Sign Recognition X    
6 Intersection Control X    
7 Intelligent Speed Adaptation  X   
8 Blind Spot Detection  X   
9 Alcolock Key   X  
10 Advanced Automatic Crash Notification   X  
11 Night Vision   X  
12 Collision Avoidance    X 
13 Predictive Brake Assist    X 
14 Dynamic Suspension    X 
15 Drowsy Driver Detection System    X 
16 Advanced Front Light System    X 
17 Rear Light Brake Force Display    X 
18 Collision Warning    X 
19 Advanced Adaptive Cruise Control    X 
 
The target population method (calculating only the 
proportion of crashes addressed by the function) is 
used only for cases where this population is low and 
does not imply a full calculation of effectiveness.  
Neural Networks are used to investigate the impact of 
primary safety functions on restriction of accident 
consequences.  The proposed approach investigated 
the effectiveness of several safety functions on 
different accident configurations, by estimating the 
influence of each safety function on different 
accident parameters.  The evaluation is performed in 
terms of assessment of the potential proportion of 
accidents whose severity could be reduced, for each 
safety function. Other methods are chosen according 
to the function under study, availability of data and 
relevance of the method. Full definitions of the 
functions are described in the TRACE reports. We 
are just reporting here their generic titles which are 
sufficient to understand the concept but not to 
understand how they work.  
The main results coming out from the analysis are 
presented in table 3.  This table shows the overall 
effectiveness evaluation results for the selected 
nineteen (19) primary safety systems for passenger 
cars that have been studied in TRACE.  In table 3 the 
safety systems effectiveness is presented in terms of: 
- Fatalities saved:  The percentage of fatalities that 
could be saved by the safety function if the fleet is 
100 % fitted with this particular function.  
- Serious injuries saved:  The percentage of serious 
injuries that could be saved if the fleet is 100 % fitted 
with this particular function. 
It should be noted that, in this table, the absence of 
calculated values in fatalities saved for some of the 
safety systems occurs because these values have not 
been calculated (and thus are not available) and does 
not suggest that those systems do not provide any 
benefits in terms of fatalities saved.  Additionally, it 
should also be noted that in some cases the 
percentage of the effectiveness in terms of fatalities 
saved is higher than the corresponding percentage in 
terms of serious injuries saved.  However, this does 
not imply that more fatalities (in absolute numbers) 
than serious injuries would be saved, since in most 
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accident configurations the number of injuries is 
much higher than the number of fatalities.  
The results show that the greatest additional safety 
gain potentials are expected from intelligent speed 
adaptation systems, automatic crash notification 
systems, and collision warning and collision 
avoidance systems. Their expected benefits (expected 
reduction in the total number of injured persons) are 
between 6% and 11%. Safety benefits of other 
systems are more often below 5%. Some systems 
have a very low expected safety benefit (around or 
less than 1%). 
 
 
Table 3. Potential safety benefits of safety systems 
 
  Effectiveness (%) 
Safety System Safety Function Fatalities Saved Serious Injuries Saved 
Intelligent Speed Adaptation (**) Drive Safe 17 11 
Advanced Automatic Crash Notification 
(***) 
Rescue 10,8 - 
Advanced Adaptive Cruise Control Drive Safe - 11 
Collision Avoidance Drive Safe - 9,1 
Collision Warning Drive Safe - 6,6 
Traffic Sign Recognition (*) Drive Safe - 5,8 
Lane Keeping Assistant (*) Drive Safe - 5,7 
Night Vision Visibility 3,5 4,8 
Blind Spot Detection (*) Drive Safe 2,5 4 
Lane Changing Assistant (*) Drive Safe - 3,1 
Alcolock Key(***,#) Drive Safe 6 3 
Drowsy Driver Detection System Drive Safe - 2,9 
Intersection Control (*) Drive Safe - 2,3 
Cornering Brake Control (*) Braking Systems - 2,3 
Tyre Pressure Monitoring and Warning (*) Drive Safe - 1,3 
Rear Light Brake Force Display Visibility - 0,8 
Advanced Adaptive Front Light System Visibility - 0,6 
Predictive Assist Braking Braking Systems - 0,2 
Dynamic Suspension Handling/Kinematics - 0 
* The potential magnitude (target population) of the effectiveness has been calculated 
** The numbers are for the 'Driver Select' ISA configuration which has been estimated as the most effective 
*** Results based on non-European data 
# For the Alcolock Key the results for the mode "All newly registered vehicles (First full year)" with effectiveness 25% is used 
which gives the highest results but it is above the average performance of Alcolock key 
N/A Not Applicable 
- Value not available 
 
A Posteriori Effectiveness 
 
The first task of this part was to select the safety 
applications to be studied. Depending on the 
availability of crash data and also considering the 
actual low penetration rate of active safety functions, 
we have selected for evaluation the Electronic 
Stability Control (ESC) and the Emergency Brake 
Assist (EBA) systems. 
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As for the passive safety systems, newer cars are 
designed to offer good overall protection. Car 
structure, load limiters, front airbags, side airbags, 
knee airbags, pretensioners, padding and non 
aggressive structures in the door panel, the 
dashboard, the windshield, the seats, the head rest 
also participate in supplying more protection. The 
whole package is then very difficult to evaluate 
separately, one element independently from the 
others. We have then decided to consider that we 
would evaluate in TRACE the safety of the whole 
package, this package being, for the sake of 
simplicity, the number of stars awarded at the Euro 
NCAP testing. 
The challenges were to compare the effectiveness of 
some safety configuration SC I with the effectiveness 
of some safety configuration SC II [14, 24]. A safety 
configuration (SC) can be understood as a package of 
safety functions.  
Ten comparisons have been carried out and the 
evaluations presented in table 4 are now available 
[15]. 
The evaluation of the potential safety benefits of 
existing safety functions is expected to be carried out 
at the EU25 or EU 27 level. It would mean that: 
- either the relevant data is available at that level 
and the above-mentioned analysis is done with 
the European data 
- or the relevant data is not available at the EU 
level and the analysis is done with the data 
available in a selection of countries, the results 
being expanded at the EU level with an 
appropriate technique. 
The relevant data is actually not available at the EU 
level. We have then chosen to conduct the analysis 
with the French data and try to expand the results at 
the EU level if possible. 
As explained and discussed in the TRACE reports, 
the data relevant for such an analysis is a 
macroscopic accident dataset in which we can get 
information about vehicles involved in crashes (and 
especially their equipment) and about the crash and 
the impact configurations. We chose to use the 
French Injury Crash census. 
 
  
Table 4: Evaluation of the effectiveness of existing safety package 
 
 
Reduction in injury 
accidents (accident 
avoidance) 
Reduction in all 
injuries & fatalities 
Reduction in severe 
injuries and fatalities 
Safety benefit of EBA given that the car 
has four stars (Euro NCAP). 
-3.2% 7.8% 14.6% 
Safety benefit of ESC given that the car 
has four stars and an EBA. 
5.2% 10.3% 16,8% 
Safety benefit of ESC given that the car 
has five stars and an EBA. 
3.2% 10.7% (*) 23.4% (*) 
Safety benefit of the fifth star given that 
the car has four stars and an EBA. 6,4% 8,3% N.A. 
Safety benefit of the fifth star given that 
the car has four stars, an EBA and an ESC. 
19.3% (*) 33,8% (*) 35,1% (*) 
Safety benefit of EBA and ESC given that 
the car has four stars. 
18,6% 36,3% (*) 42,3% 
Safety benefit of EBA and a fifth star 
given that the car has four stars. 
28,2% (*) 36% (*) 37,5% (*) 
Safety benefit of ESC and a fifth star 
given that the car has four stars and an 
EBA. 
22% (*) 38,6% (*) 37,1% (*) 
Safety benefit EBA, ESC and a fifth star 
given that the car has four stars. 
47,2% (*) 67,8% (*) 69,5% (*) 
Safety benefit of a fifth star and removing 
an ESC given that the car has four stars, an 
EBA and an ESC. 
2,1% N.A. N.A. 
* Statistically significant 
 
The French accident national database gathers all 
information on every injury road accident occurring 
all over France during a year. This database only 
focuses on accidents in which at least one road user 
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sustains injuries. No property-damage accident is 
registered in this database. The information is 
collected by the Police forces on the scene of the 
accident. On the basis of the police report, usually 
used for forensic purpose, they also have to fill in a 
statistical form called BAAC (Bulletin d’Analyse 
d’Accident Corporel) bringing together all the 
characteristic of the accident.  
Among all the vehicles within our injury accidents 
database, a selection has been made in order to retain 
only crashed vehicles that were pertinent for the 
analysis.  
Firstly, we selected French vehicles whose model 
year stands between 2000 and 2006. We restricted 
our analysis to four and five star vehicles, excluding 
three stars vehicles. It was useless to keep vehicles 
with model years prior to year 2000 since 
considerable improvements have been brought to car 
crashworthiness since the late nineties and the 
additional benefits of newer passive or active safety 
devices must be compared to vehicles built just prior 
to these improvements and not a long time ago. 
We also selected cars fitted with ABS since this is 
now standard equipment.  
The presence of EBA and ESC in the car also had to 
be stated. The vehicles with optional equipment were 
not taken into account, as we could not be sure if the 
safety function was really on board. There were some 
special cases where the optional equipment has been 
considered as if it was not present on the vehicle 
(ESC equipment for the Megane for instance since 
the equipment rate for some vehicles was known to 
be very low).  
We must explain that the injury severity codification 
was changed in 2005 in France (the split between 
slight and serious injuries changed towards a split 
between slight and hospitalized injuries). There is not 
any evident correlation between the new and the 
former classification. It becomes impossible to 
aggregate data of accidents occurred before 2005 
with those concerning accidents from 2005 on, at 
least if the analysis deals with injury severity. 
Therefore, we had to perform our analysis on the 
accident cases that occurred in 2005 and 2006.  
The last selection concerned the use of the seat belt 
and the seating position in the vehicle; only the belted 
driver and front passenger were selected for the 
analysis. 
Available in our sample were 15 466 four star 
vehicles and 4 610 five star vehicles. 
The main striking results coming out from the 
analysis are what we call the ‘overall effectiveness’ 
of the selected safety systems with breakdown by 
injury severity levels (table 4). This ‘overall 
effectiveness’ represents the percentage of reduction 
in injury accident and injuries that would be observed 
if all cars would be fitted with the system(s) under 
consideration, compared to cars of a reference group. 
Reference groups are not always the same, the less 
equipped reference group being 4 star cars without 
EBA, without ESC. 
This overall effectiveness is derived from the specific 
effectiveness which is the effectiveness of the safety 
configurations which applies only to accident types 
or impact types for which the safety systems are 
designed for. 
The main outcome of this analysis is that any 
increment of a passive or active safety function 
selected in this analysis (5 stars, Emergency Brake 
Assist, Electronic Stability Control) produces 
additional safety benefits. In general, the safety gains 
are higher for higher severity levels [15]. For 
example, if all cars were five stars fitted with EBA 
and ESC, compared to four stars without ESC and 
EBA, injury accidents would be reduced by 47.2%, 
all injuries would be mitigated by 67.8% and severe 
+ fatal injuries by 69.5%. 
The results are very positive and encouraging, 
showing great potential for the generalization of the 
selected safety applications and validating the 
choices made so far by the various stakeholders who 
have been pushing the installation of safety 
technologies in the passenger cars for years. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
Apart from considerable improvements in the 
methodologies applicable to accident research in the 
field of human factors, statistics and epidemiology, 
allowing a better understanding of the crash 
generating issues, the TRACE project quantified the 
expected safety benefits for existing and future safety 
applications. 
- As for existing safety functions or safety packages, 
the main striking results show that any increment of a 
passive or active safety function selected in this 
project produces additional safety benefits. In general, 
the safety gains are even higher for higher injury 
severity levels. For example, if all cars were five stars 
and fitted with EBA and ESC, compared to four stars 
without ESC and EBA, injury accidents would be 
reduced by 47%, all injuries would be mitigated by 
68% and severe + fatal injuries by 70%. 
- As for future advanced safety functions, TRACE 
investigated 19 safety systems. The results show that 
the greatest additional safety gains potential are 
expected from intelligent speed adaptation systems, 
automatic crash notification systems, and collision 
warning and collision avoidance systems. Their 
expected benefits (expected reduction in the total 
number of injured persons) are between 6% and 11%. 
Safety benefits of other systems are more often below 
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5%. Some systems have a very low expected safety 
benefit (around or less than 1%). 
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